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A Long and Winding Road: The Doha Round Negotiation in the World
Trade Organization
Sungjoon Cho♠
Abstract
This article provides a concise history of the Doha Round negotiation, analyzes
its deadlock and offers some suggestions for a successful deal. The article
observes that the nearly decade long negotiational stalemate is symptomatic of
the diametrically opposed beliefs on the nature of the Round between developed
and developing countries. While developed countries appear to be increasingly
oblivious of Doha’s exigency, i.e., as a “development” round, developing
countries vehemently condemn the developed countries’ narrow commercial
focus on the Doha Round talks. It will not be easy to untie this Gordian knot
since both Worlds tend to think that no deal is better than a bad deal. This
political dilemma notwithstanding, the current global economic crisis has been
a clarion call for a successful Doha deal. Ironically, the widespread protectionist
reactions from both developed and developing countries alike have highlighted
the vital importance of a well-operating multilateral trading system. The article
concludes that the U.S. must not fail to exercise its due leadership in
crystallizing such momentum into a concrete outcome, as it did in the interwar
period.
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Introduction
On July 29, 2008, Pascal Lamy, the head of the World Trade Organization
(WTO)1, bitterly declared the collapse of the most recent Doha Round talks in
Geneva. Even his eleventh hour Herculean effort to forge the differences among
the major negotiating groups was of no avail. As of August 2009, after eight years
of talks, the Doha Round still has no framework (modalities) deal, let alone final
national schedules. A recidivistic pattern of collapses and resumptions in the
negotiation process has fostered a sense of defeatism and learned helplessness
among delegates. As such, the 2008 collapse did not appear entirely alien: it was
just a recurring scene from the past. Because of the current economic and
political circumstances, as well as the underlying lack of political will (capital)
among WTO members, the successful resolution of the Doha Round undoubtedly
remains a “tough sell”2.
This nearly decade long negotiational stalemate is symptomatic of the
diametrically opposed beliefs on the nature of the Round between developed and
developing countries. Developed countries appear to be increasingly oblivious of
Doha’s exigency, i.e., as a “development” round launched in response to the
urgency of the September 11 terrorist attacks and the UN Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs).3 These countries, such as the U.S. and the E.U.,
tend to consider the development nature of Doha Round as a liability, rather than
a goal. Attributing Doha’s stalemate to its uncommon (“development”) label for a
trade round, developed countries observed that “with a narrow agenda centered
on giving market access to poor countries, little incentive was offered to the
leading trading nations to compromise.” 4 This position tends to regard any
concessions in agricultural liberalization as potential bargaining chips to
exchange squarely for reciprocal concessions from developing countries. Of
Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994, Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations [hereinafter
WTO Agreement], LEGAL INSTRUMENTS–RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 6, 6-18; 33 I.L.M. 1140,
1144-1153 (1994).
2 Stephen Castle & Mark Landler, After 7 Years, Talks on Trade Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 30,
2008.
3 In the Doha Ministerial Declaration of 2001, WTO members highlighted that “the majority of
WTO members are developing countries” and agreed to “place [developing countries’] needs and
interests at the heart of the Work Programme adopted in this Declaration.” WTO, Ministerial
Declaration: The Fourth WTO Ministerial Meeting (Doha, Qatar), WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (adopted
Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. Some commentators observe that grand-scale
agreements format” became “obsolete.” Alan Beattie, Doha Hangovers but No Anger Next
Morning, FIN. TIMES, Jul. 30, 2008 [hereinafter Doha Hangovers]. Yet the innovative
negotiational procedures (“concentric circles”) espoused by the WTO Director-General Pascal
Lamy proved to be effective in gathering convergences. See WTO, The July 2008 Package –
Seeking Consensus, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/meet08_circles_popup_e.htm#.
4 The Next Step for World Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2008.
1

course, developed countries’ main target is not the world’s poorest countries but
those emerging countries, such as India, Brazil and China. Developed countries
thus condition their reduction of farm protection on these emerging countries’
matching reduction of industrial tariffs. This is why the Obama administration
still believes that the most recent Doha package is “imbalance[d].”5
Developing countries, however, condemn this narrow commercial focus on
the Doha Round talks.6 To developing countries, the Doha trade talks should not
be yet another Wall Street deal. Principally, developing countries view the “Doha
Development Agenda (DDA)” as an avenue for reducing or eliminating old unfair
protection by developed countries. In this context, developing countries perceive
developed countries’ consistent demand of quid-pro-quo throughout the Round
as an unconscionable dereliction of Doha’s development mandate. Even
emerging economies argue that they should be granted larger “policy space” than
developed countries in cutting industrial tariffs, given the former’s limited
institutional capability.7
In sum, WTO members are split between two diametrically opposed
Worlds. This stark philosophical divergence on the nature of the Doha Round is
the main culprit for the negotiational deadlock. It will not be easy to untie this
Gordian knot since both Worlds tend to think that no deal is better than a bad
deal.8 A new geography of power defined by the recent rise of emerging
economies has also contributed to this deadlock.9 Under these circumstances, the
Doha Round may be relegated to inconvenience, irrelevance or incorrectness as
far as politicians of both Worlds are concerned.
The political dilemma notwithstanding, the current global economic crisis
has been a clarion call for a successful Doha deal. Ironically, the widespread
protectionist reactions from both developed and developing countries alike have
highlighted the vital importance of a well-operating multilateral trading system.10
Moreover, the fact that the crisis tends to victimize the poor in a highly
disproportionate manner has also amplified the original mission for a
development round.11 This is the moment of truth for the U.S. leadership, which
can help crystallize such momentum into a concrete outcome as it overcomes
many political hurdles, domestic and international. As Charles Kindleberger aptly
observed more than three decades ago, the lack of the U.S. leadership contributed
5 United State Trade Representative, The President’s Trade Policy Agenda for 2009, Mar. 2009,
available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2009/2009_Trade_Policy_Age
nda/Section_Index.html [hereinafter 2009 Trade Policy Agenda].
6 See text accompanying infra note _.
7 WTO Secretariat, Developmental Aspects of the Doha Round of Negotiations, in AGREEING AND
IMPLEMENTING THE DOHA ROUND OF THE WTO [hereinafter AGREEING AND IMPLEMENTING] 49
(Harald Hohmann ed. 2008).
8 See e.g., U.S. Presses WTO for Details on Doha Round Benefits, REUTERS, Apr. 14, 2009
(reporting that the U.S. business groups are pressuring the Obama administration not to agree on
the current form of the Doha deal).
9 See e.g., BRIC Makes Formal Debut with First Summit Meeting, XINHUA, Jun. 14, 2009
(observing that the rapid economic growth of BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China)
has led them to “reposition” themselves in the international sphere).
10 See Steven Mufson, WTO Seeks to Curtail Protectionist Measures, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2009.
11 See Mark Landler, Dire Forecast for Global Economy and Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2008.

greatly to the deepening of the Great Depression.12 Now in the face of the biggest
crisis since the Great Depression, what the global economic system truly needs is
“a country which is prepared (…) to set standards of conduct for other countries;
and to seek to get others to follow them, to take on an undue share of the burdens
of the system.”13
Against this backdrop, this article provides a concise history of the Doha
Round negotiation, analyzes its deadlock and offers some suggestions for a
successful deal. The article unfolds in the following sequence. Part I traces the
inglorious history of the Doha Round’s seven years of failed negotiations. It
reveals a deep-rooted tension between developed and developing countries on the
nature of the Doha “development” Round. Part II offers a post-mortem of the
collapse of the Doha deal: it observes that a confluence of underlying NorthSouth tensions and other political factors adverse to the negotiations led to the
fiasco. Part III then suggests that WTO members resume the trade talks from
where they stopped last summer, instead of re-starting the whole negotiation
from ground zero.
I. The History of Doha Round: An Inglorious Tale
A. The Genesis of a Development Round
Underdevelopment of some parts of the world has been a constant over
the last two centuries of human civilization. This is true despite the spectacular
progress of the modern global trading system during last half-century, which has
not fully redressed such development deficit. In fact, there have been troubling
signs that the world’s poor have become poorer during the last decade.14 This
ever-deepening “poverty trap”15 tends to expand the chasm between two Worlds,
the North (developed countries) and the South (developing countries).
In the past, more precisely in the Cold War era, the North-South tension
was often been eclipsed by an ideological (East-West) conflict. Furthermore, the
post-colonial politics in newly independent countries self-isolated their
economies from the mainstream global trading community via highly
questionable development strategies, such as import substitution. The South
inflicted on itself fatal development wounds by sealing the so-called “Faustian
bargain.” 16 In this metaphorical deal, the South accepted the North’s trade
barriers (such as quotas) on those products that the former held comparative
advantage (such as agricultural products and textiles) in return for certain GATT

CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, THE WORLD IN DEPRESSION 1929-1939 297-98 (1973).
Id., at 28.
14 See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: EQUITY AND DEVELOPMENT 7 (2005).
15 See Jeffrey Sachs, Helping the World's Poorest, ECONOMIST, Aug. 14, 1999 (observing that many
poor countries are “stuck in a trap of poverty” which seems inescapable without substantial
international aids).
16 MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 368 (2d
ed. 1999) (quoting Sidney Weintraub who observed that developing countries tolerated developed
countries’ trade barriers in the former’s main exports in exchange for the former’s departure from
GATT disciplines).
12
13

exemptions that had enabled the South to execute the aforementioned inwardlooking development policies.
Not until the Eighties did the South realize the futility of their old
development strategy. The South’s shift to an outward-looking (open) policy led
to its active participation in the historic trade round, the Uruguay Round (UR),
which dramatically expanded the old GATT’s operational scope and created the
WTO. 17 The North and the South struck a grand bargain, which was
instrumentalized by the “single undertaking” principle. Under the bargain, the
South aimed to undo the pernicious Faustian bargain and thus regain its market
access in the areas of agricultural products and textiles, while it accepted the
North’s demands that would broaden trade agendas where the latter retained the
comparative advantage, in areas such as services and intellectual property
rights.18
To the South’s disappointment, however, the North’s old protectionism
demonstrated no sign of relenting. The North was very slow in implementing the
UR commitments, such as phasing out textile quotas and reducing farm
protection. The South believed that the UR had largely been implemented in a
“strikingly asymmetrical manner” highly disadvantageous to developing
countries.19 This frustration has since haunted subsequent trade talks up to the
present. The scandalous debacle of the Third Ministerial Conference in Seattle in
1999 was attributable in part to this frustration by the South.20
The Doha Round came to its birth amid a grim atmosphere after the
September 11 terrorist attacks and global economic woes.21 To signal a collective
commitment to open trade and prosperity, in particular toward poor countries,
the DDA was established at the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference held in Doha,
Qatar in November 2001. As a “development” round, the DDA’s main concerns
were to reduce and/or eliminate agricultural trade barriers, such as farm
subsidies and farm tariffs, which rich countries had maintained after the launch
of the WTO. The level of urgency in the international community at the DDA’s
inception enabled negotiators to nail down an ambitious deadline of January 1,
2005 as the date for completing the Doha Round.
The South had expected to redeem in the Doha Round the raw deal which
it had suffered as a result of the UR, as the new round highlighted the
“development” dimension of trade. In the meantime, however, the North-South
17 See generally THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Will Martin & L. Alan
Winters eds. 1996).
18 See J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler, Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments: The
Development Challenge, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WTO: A PRO-ACTIVE AGENDA 115
(Bernard M. Hoekman & Will Martin eds. 2001).
19 Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The WTO in Transition: Of Constituents, Competence and Coherence, 33
GEO. WASH. INT’L L REV. 979, 981 (2001). Cf. UGO MATTEI & LAURA NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN THE
RULE OF LAW IS ILLEGAL (2008) (advancing a highly critical view on the developed countries’
exploitation of developing countries in the name of “rule of law”).
20 See Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in
Cancún and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 219 (2004) [hereinafter A
Bridge Too Far].
21 See William A. Lovett, Bargaining Challenges and Conflicting Interests: Implementing the
Doha Round; 17 AM. U. INTL. L. REV. 951 (2002) (documenting how the September 11 terrorist
attacks led to the creation of the Doha round).

line in the Doha Round has been reinforced due to the emergence of a new
geography of power resulting largely from China’s participation.22 As negotiations
proceeded, the original cause for development could not match the tough
commercial realities on the ground. Developed countries’ governments simply
lacked the political capital to bring this “development” cause to light without
serious concessions from developing countries. In other words, even this
“development” label could not overcome, or at least alleviate, the traditional
mercantilist quid pro quo reciprocity in the trade talks. Soon, irreconcilable
fissures over the depth and the breadth of liberalization eventually derailed the
fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún, Mexico in September 2003.
B. Collapses and Missed Deadlines
The fanfare of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún, Mexico quickly
transformed into a disgraceful tumult of infuriation and finger-pointing.
According to the original plan, the Cancún Conference was supposed to deliver a
basic deal on the modalities (framework) on the basis of which WTO members
opened their markets to implement the DDA by the end of 2004. Yet major
developed countries were simply not prepared to reform their long-standing
agricultural protection policies necessary to meet such ambition. Some observed
that the U.S.’s $ 180 billions farm bill and the EU’s refusal to reform its Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) led by a Franco-German collusion made a “mockery of
the idea that the Doha round was to be a development round.”23 In a frustrating
testimony to rich countries’ farm protectionism, the U.S. refused to reduce its
notorious “cotton” subsidies, even in the face of desperate pleas from Africa’s
Cotton Four (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali) and then WTO Director
General Supachai.24 One African farmer deplored that “we are used to hardship,
disease and famine. Now the WTO is against us as well. I think that this will stay
in history.”25
This irreconcilable fissure over farm subsidies between the rich and poor
countries drove them to pick an easy excuse to discontinue the trade talks. At the
first WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore, WTO members provisionally
agreed to study the relationship between trade and some controversial issues,
such as investment and competition (“Singapore issues”), by establishing
“working groups.”26 These Singapore issues turned out to be a deal breaker in
A Bridge Too Far, supra note _ , at _.
World Trade: Coming Unstuck, THE ECONOMIST, at 14, Nov. 2, 2002; The Zoellick Plan:
Trading Insults, THE ECONOMIST, at 67, Nov. 30, 2002.
24 Bridges Daily Update on the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, Issue 5, At the Eleventh Hour,
Divergence All Over Again, Sep. 14, 2003,
http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/cancun/wto_daily/ben030914.htm [hereinafter 2003 Bridges,
Issue 5]. See also Kevin C. Kennedy, The Doha Round Negotiations on Agricultural Subsidies, 36
DENV. J. INTL. L. & POL’Y L. 335 (2008) (demonstrating that cotton subsidies in rich countries
have driven down the prices of cotton in the global market).
25 2003 Bridges, Issue 5, supra note _.
26 They connote four issues: trade facilitation, transparency in government procurement,
investment, and competition. WTO, The Singapore Ministerial Declaration, adopted on Dec. 13,
1996, WT/MIN(96)/DEC,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm, paras 20-23.
22

23

Cancún when some developed countries demanded these issues to be part of
DDA, which most developing countries vehemently opposed. 27 Developing
countries suspected that they might provide a backdoor to disguised
protectionism. The Cancún debacle was a gloomy premonition for the DDR’s
trying path ahead.
After the Cancún debacle, the Doha trade talks were largely deadlocked
until the summer of 2004 when negotiators managed to work out the “July 2004
Package.” The 2004 July Package contained the basic principles and framework
for establishing the modalities in future negotiations. For example, the July 2004
Package adopted a “tiered” approach to reducing farm subsidies and tariffs,
which required that a member with a higher level of trade-distorting agricultural
subsidies and agricultural tariffs cut its subsidies and tariffs to a higher degree.28
In the reduction of industrial tariffs, developing countries would have longer
implementation periods as well as some “flexibility” in choosing tariff lines to
cut.29
Nonetheless, the July 2004 Package failed to motivate WTO members to
further narrow down their differences in their substantive positions. Domestic
political situations in major member countries continued to militate against
concessions. For example, then French President Jacques Chirac vowed to “block
a world trade deal” if the EU’s concession exceeded the status quo of the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 30 In this antagonistic atmosphere,
negotiators could not gain the ground in their talks that matched their original
ambition. The revised plan for the Doha Round was to achieve some concrete
approximation on their wide differences in critical issues such as the size of the
reduction of farm subsidies and tariffs by July 2005, and then to deliver a deal on
the modalities in the upcoming Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in December
2005.31 Under this scenario, WTO members might have finalized the whole round
by the end of 2006.32 Yet the aforementioned political climate was not ready for
the so-called “July Approximation.”33 Having failed to resolve their differences,
WTO members lowered their expectations for the Hong Kong Ministerial
Conference.34

A Bridge Too Far, supra note _ , at _.
Text of the ‘July Package’ — the General Council’s Post-Cancún Decision, Annex A: Framework
for Establishing Modalities in Agriculture, WT/L/579, Aug. 2, 2004.
29 Text of the ‘July Package’ — the General Council’s Post-Cancún Decision, Annex B: Framework
for Establishing Modalities in Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products, WT/L/579, Aug. 2,
2004.
30 See George Parker et al, Chirac Fires Warning Shot on Trade Deal in Defense of Farm
Subsidies, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at 4.
31 ICTSD, WTO Members Aim For July ‘Approximations,’ Hong Kong Deal, WTO Ministerial
Section, vol. 9, no. 5, Feb. 16, 2005, available at http://ictsd.net/i/news/bridgesweekly/7683/.
32 Id.
33 Alan Beattie & Frances Williams, Prospects for WTO Gloomier as Talks End, FIN. TIMES, Jul.
27, 2005, at 6.
34 See Members Scale Back Expectations for Hong Kong, BRIDGES WKLY TRADE NEWS DIG., vol. 9,
No. 38, Nov. 9, 2005; Dark Clouds over Doha, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 10, 2005.
27
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These recalibrated expectations naturally led to a largely face-saving pact
in Hong Kong. 35 After an intense six-day talk, during which one negotiator
analogized to “working like a dog,”36 delegates managed to seal a modest deal on
an interim package on December 18, 2005. 37 The Hong Kong Ministerial
Declaration included some meaningful numbers, such as deadlines for getting rid
of agricultural export subsidies (2013) and cotton export subsidies (2006), as
well as a developmentally critical commitment that the least developed countries
(LDCs)’s exports enjoy duty and quota-free access, at least up to 97%, by 2008.
The positive view of the Hong Kong deal is that it put the Doha Round “back on
track” with a “rebalancing in the favor of developing countries”38 At the same
time, however, the negative view of the deal was that it failed to deliver the
agreement on “modalities,” which refer to the basic structure of trade
liberalization in the agricultural and non-agricultural (NAMA) sector.
Negotiators simply procrastinated on this controversial issue and agreed that
they would establish the modalities by April 30, 2006.39
As the Doha trade talks continued, it became clear that to reach a deal on
the modalities three main players should substantially reduce their respective
trade barriers. In other words, the U.S. should cut its farm subsidies, the EU
should reduce its farm tariffs, and large developing countries (such as India,
Brazil and China) should lower their industrial tariffs.40 The problem was how to
form a “triangle” with these three sides as commitments. Each side demanded a
bigger concession from the others. Unfortunately, rich countries refused to reflect
the “development” agenda in the negotiating (triangulating) process. The U.S.
and the EU failed to take into full account developing countries’ concerns for
“social dislocation and adjustment” in the case of any sudden and massive
liberalization.41 To these developing countries, the Doha triangle should not be
“equilateral” in the sense that rich countries’ reduction of farm subsidies and
tariffs must be conditioned strictly on social sufferings of poor countries caused
by any improvident market opening. 42 One might reasonably speculate that
adequate social safety net programs which could cushion negative impacts from

See e.g., Richard Waddington, WTO Seeks Face-Saving Pact to Keep Talks Moving, REUTERS,
Dec. 13, 2005.
36 WTO, Summary of December 18, 2005, Day 6: Ministers Agree on Declaration that ‘Puts
Round Back on Track,’ available at
http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/minist_e/min05_e/min05_18dec_e.htm [hereinafter
WTO Hong Kong, Day 6].
37 WTO Ministerial Conference (Sixth Session, Hong Kong, Dec. 13-18, 2005), Doha Work
Program: Draft Ministerial Declaration (Revision), WT/MIN(05)/W/3/Rev., Dec. 18, 2005,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/min05_e.htm.
38 WTO Hong Kong, Day 6, supra note _.
39 Sungjoon Cho, Half Full or Half Empty?: The Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Conference Has
Delivered an Interim Deal for the Doha Round Negotiation, ASIL INSIGHTS (Dec. 29, 2005).
40 Lamy Sets End-June Deadline for AG, NAMA Modalities, BRIDGES WKLY TRADE NEWS DIG. - vol.
10, no. 19, 31 May 2006.
41 WTO Talks In “Crisis” as High-Level Meeting Fails; Lamy to Try to Facilitate Consensus,
BRIDGES WKLY TRADE NEWS DIG. - Special Update 3 July 2006 [hereinafter WTO Talks In “Crisis”].
42 Following G8 Summit, G-6 Ministers to Renew Push for Doha Round Deal, BRIDGES WKLY
TRADE NEWS DIG. - Vol. 10, Number 26 19 July 2006.
35

trade liberalization would not be available in those developing countries on
account of their governments’ budget shortfalls and vast populations.
Amid this impasse, the modicum of optimism for a successful trade round
that had rekindled in Hong Kong soon died out. The end of the April 2006
deadline for the modalities deal set in the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference43
lapsed and was replaced by an end of June 2006 deadline,44 which also lapsed
without meaningful development. 45 On July 28, 2006, upon the DirectorGeneral’s recommendation, the WTO General Council officially suspended the
negotiation due to irreconcilable differences among negotiators over three major
trade barriers: farm subsidies, farm tariffs, and industrial tariffs.46 Without the
announcement of any future negotiation schedule, the Doha Round’s future had
become marred by uncertainty.
C. A Ray of Hope?: The July 2008 Package
Pascal Lamy declared the resumption of the stalled negotiation in
February 2007 after trade ministers from major WTO members informally
gathered in the Davos World Economic Forum in January 2007 and recommitted
themselves to further negotiations. 47 As 2008 dawned, the agricultural
negotiation emerged with some significant developments as the Chair improved
an agricultural modalities draft each time that he issued a new one, although the
Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) negotiation demonstrated to be a
tougher process.48 Both Chairs in the agricultural sector (Crawford Falconer) and
NAMA (Don Stephenson) issued a series of drafts in February, May and July
2008, respectively, which identified areas of convergences (and divergences) and
provided negotiators with “simplified” options for modalities.49
The July Chair drafts on both agriculture and NAMA, which were
collectively labeled the “July 2008 Package,” was a hybrid of liberalization
commitments (concessions) and exceptions which would serve as political safety
valves. First, in the agricultural sector, the Package required those developed
countries (EU and Japan) whose total farm subsidies (overall trade-distorting
domestic support (OTDS)) exceed $60 billion to cut by 75-85%; it also required
those developed countries whose OTDS falls between $10 and $60 billion to cut
by 66-73%. As to agricultural market access, the Package required developed
countries to cut their bound tariffs more drastically when they are higher (0-20%
43 See Sungjoon Cho, Half Full or Half Empty?: The Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Conference
Has Delivered an Interim Deal for the Doha Round Negotiation, ASIL INSIGHTS, Dec. 29, 2005,
http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/12/insights051229.html.
44 Lamy Sets End-June Deadline for AG, NAMA Modalities, BRIDGES WKLY TRADE NEWS DIG. Vol. 10, Number 19, 31 May 2006.
45 WTO News-DDA June/July 2006 Modalities, ‘We Are Now in Crisis,’ Director-General to Try
to Break Impasse, Jul. 1, 2006.
46 WTO News – General Council, General Council Supports Suspension of Trade Talks, Task
Force Submits “Aid for Trade” Recommendations, July 27-28, 2006.
47 WTO, Lamy: “We Have Resumed Negotiations Fully across the Border,” Feb. 7, 2007.
48 . Slow Progress on Industrial Goods Talks in Final Push to Ministerial, BRIDGES WKLY TRADE
NEWS DIG., vol. 12, no. 25 (Jul. 9, 2008).
49 Chair of WTO AG Talks Says New Draft Text Will Simplify Options for Ministers, BRIDGES
WKLY TRADE NEWS DIG., vol. 12, no. 25 (Jul. 9, 2008).

 48-52%; 20-50%  55-60%; 50-75%  62-65%; over 75%  66-73%) in
accordance with the so-called Swiss formula. The Package granted developing
countries some leniency in tariff cuts, which would amount largely to two-thirds
of those by developed countries.
In terms of exceptions to the agricultural liberalization, the Package
permitted both developed and developing countries to exempt certain
(“sensitive”) products from the aforementioned general reduction scheme on the
condition that these countries expand tariff quotas for those products. It granted
developed countries the ability to designate 4-6% of their tariff lines as sensitive
products; it granted developing countries roughly one-third more than what
developed countries would designate as sensitive products. As to the “special
products” which was an exclusive exception to developing countries for food
security reasons, the Package was silent in the numerical target, although the
previous (May) draft allowed the self-designation by developing countries of 820% of their tariff lines. As to the “special agricultural safeguard” for developing
countries, the Package failed to even suggest any numerical indicators, attesting
to the sheer lack of convergence. Finally, the Package required developed
countries to eliminate export subsidies by 2013.
As to NAMA (industrial tariffs reduction), the Package suggested two
coefficients (the maximum level of industrial tariffs) for both developed (8-9%)
and developing countries (19-23%). Yet controversies and wide divergences
between developed and developing countries continued over such a reduction
scheme. While major developing countries, such as Brazil, India and South Africa,
complained that the Package demanded over-liberalization from them in the area
of industrial tariffs, developed countries, such as the U.S. and the EU, argued that
the current draft would not deliver genuine liberalization since it failed to make
deep cuts in “applied” tariffs. The same nature of divergences emerged over
sector-specific liberalization initiatives (such as chemicals and industrial
machinery). In particular, developing countries tried to stave off developed
countries’ pressure to lower industrial tariffs through this mechanism by
emphasizing that it is a “voluntary” program. 50 China exhibited the most
vehement opposition to this issue as the U.S. targeted China to further open the
latter’s market via this mechanism.51
Despite some concrete headline numbers in the Package, its draft
modalities were not without complications. Many devilish details continued to
haunt the whole scheme. For example, while sensitive products would grant
members more modest tariff cuts in exchange for increasing import quotas, the
scope of actual quota increase is based on the volume of consumption of
agricultural products at issue. Yet consumption data may not be available, in
particular regarding highly specified sub-categories of a product (e.g., particular
cuts of beef) which importing countries want to designate as sensitive so as to
“pinpoint” protection for those products.52
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D. So Close Yet So Far: The Demise of the 2008 Geneva Ministerial
Conference
When the WTO’s head, Pascal Lamy, summoned trade ministers to
Geneva in the summer of 2008, the odds for a successful deal on modalities were
more than fifty percent.53 Truly, most negotiators felt compelled to complete the
Doha Round in the foreseeable future, especially considering the global financial
turmoil. 54 Nonetheless, once the actual negotiation set, off the general pace
turned out to be rather tedious. The U.S.’ ostensibly bold offer to limit its overall
trade-distorting support (OTDS) to $17 billion, which was a notable improvement
from its previous position of $22.5 billion, failed to impress its developing
country partners.55 Developing countries quickly pointed out that even $17 billion
was much higher than the U.S.’ actual farm spending of $ 7-8 billion in 2007.56
This “water,” which in the WTO’s vernacular refers to a gap between an official
limit (cap) and actual spending, was also of concern to developed countries. The
U.S. and the EU accused major developing countries (India and Brazil) of
refusing to reduce actual (“applied”) tariffs by simply slashing “bound” tariffs in
the book.57
After days of negotiation, no clear signs of progress emerged, although
Pascal Lamy, in an effort to expedite the negotiation, adopted an innovative yet
controversial methodology (“concentric circles”). This method refers to a
consensus-seeking process linking small group meetings (such as those defined
by “variable geometry”) to formal plenary meetings.58 At long last, on the sixth
day a ray of hope shone over the stalemated Doha Round negotiation. On the
verge of the talk’s collapse, Lamy managed to persuade negotiators to continue by
presenting the critical “package of elements,”59 which might have been coined the
“Lamy Draft.” This deal-salvaging package was nothing more than a deliberate
compromise proposal based on the most recent draft modalities on agriculture
and NAMA.
What Lamy did was to present some concrete headline numbers on several
major sticking issues (ranging from farm subsidies to industrial tariffs’ reduction)
in an articulated fashion out of the intense consultations among the seven key
negotiating parties (G 7: the U.S., the EU, Australia, Japan, China, Brazil and
India) under the concentric circles approach. According to the Lamy Draft, the
U.S. should cut the current bound level of farm subsidies (U.S.$ 48 billion) to
U.S.$ 14 billion (which was still much higher than the actual spending last year of
U.S.$ 7 billion).60 The EU should cut its farm subsidies by 80%, to approximately
Geneva Mini-Ministerial: ‘Now or Never’ For Real This Time?, BRIDGES UPDATE, Jul. 21, 2008
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22 billion euros. As to the market access, the Draft called for a 70% reduction for
developed countries’ highest (above 75%) farm tariffs. At the same time, the Draft
allowed developed countries to designate 4 percent of their agricultural tariff
lines as sensitive products. Yet developed countries should cap tariffs on nonsensitive agricultural products at 100%.
Under the Draft, developing countries were also allowed to shelter 12% of
all covered products (“special products”) from the normal tariff reduction. As to
the special safeguard mechanism (SSM), developing countries could use it only
when an imports’ surge would be by more than 40% in volume. As to NAMA,
coefficients (the maximum level of tariffs) would be 8% for developed countries
and 20, 22 or 25% for developing countries, depending on three different
“flexibility” mechanisms. Developing countries could choose from these flexibility
mechanisms to protect some of their strategic products more than others within
these limits. Finally, the Draft proposed to hold the “Services Signaling
Conference” to gather voluntary commitments in service-sector liberalization
from developing countries in an effort to give some comfort to developed
countries.61
Frustratingly, however, this rather “unexpected momentum” soon
evaporated as the U.S. wrangled with India and China over the SSM and cotton,
respectively. 62 India maintained a recalcitrant stance against tightening the
eligibility of the SSM, while China severely criticized the U.S. for pressuring its
China to open its cotton market as a condition to cut the U.S cotton subsidies. On
the last (ninth) day of the talks, the core negotiating group (G 7: Australia, US,
EU, Japan, China, India, and Brazil), and more narrowly the U.S. and G-33 bloc
of food-importing developing countries (India/China/Indonesia), failed to close
their gaps in some details of the SSM.63 Other than this holdup, the deal was close
to completion since negotiators had managed to reach a consensus on nearly all
other sticking points.64
The U.S. insisted that an importing country might impose these
emergency tariffs above the current WTO limits determined at the previous
Uruguay Round only when imports increase more than by 40% over the
preceding three years, while India wanted the trigger to be 15%.65 India argued
that with a 40% threshold the SSM would be inoperable “because India’s ability
to monitor its imports of individual products is so haphazard that by the time the
government detected a 40% import surge farmers would already be committing
suicide en masse.”66 Nonetheless, the U.S. was adamant with this 40% threshold,
permitting no compromise; it also refused Pascal Lamy’s alternative proposal
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which would have replaced this numerical trigger by an expert review on
“demonstrable harm,” which India accepted.67
Jagdish Bhagwati blamed the U.S. as the “central spoiler” of the 2008
Geneva Ministerial Conference. According to Bhagwati, the U.S. refused to
reduce significantly its trade-distorting farm subsidies which are “universally
recognized as intolerable,” while it attacked India for asking enhanced safeguards
protection for its mostly subsistent, rural farmers.68 Ironically, however, then
United States Trade Representative (USTR) Susan Schwab probably did a service
to the WTO since a deal sealed in Geneva yet only killed later in Washington
might have dealt a more severe blow to the WTO.69
II. Reflections on the Doha’s Failure: What Went Wrong?
What caused the Doha’s collapse? As may be seen with other historic
incidences, attributing certain factors to any event is a tricky business. Yet there
may have been a unique context for the Doha round which has militated against
the smooth negotiation in a consistent manner. For example, a very different
expectation for the Doha (development) Round between the North and the South
may have complicated the negotiation’s entire process. Adverse election cycles in
major economies as well as the recent global economic recession may have also
rendered any concessions (liberalization commitments) politically unpalatable.
Or, as a more immediate cause, an unfortunate discordant chemistry among
major negotiators may have triggered the demise. At any rate, a sobering
exploration of causes and contributing factors for the Doha’s failure seems to be
in order if we want to alter the direction of future trade talks for a successful
round.
A. The Primary Cause: Irreconcilable Agendas of Development and
Mercantilism
As discussed above, the Doha round was meant to be a “development”
round. The Doha Ministerial Declaration (2001) reads that:
International trade can play a major role in the promotion of economic
development and the alleviation of poverty. We recognize the need for all
our peoples to benefit from the increased opportunities and welfare gains
that the multilateral trading system generates. The majority of WTO
members are developing countries. We seek to place their needs and
interests at the heart of the Work Programme adopted in this
Declaration.”70
However, the initial “development” focus of the Doha Round quickly
blurred and faded. Some observers from developed countries even believe that
the DDA label tended to distance powerful stakeholders (businesses and
industries) who might think the Doha trade talks would be mere charity and thus
WTO, Day 9, supra note _.
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find little incentive for their participation. 71 They argue that what developed
countries basically perceive the Doha Round as merely yet another “commercial”
negotiation, in which they could press the market opening by big developing
countries, such as China, India and Brazil.72
For example, the U.S. conditioned the reduction of its farm subsidies
firmly on other members’ concessions, not only on the EU’s reduction of farm
tariffs but also on developing countries’ (such as China and India) disarmament
of special protection on their crops for non-mercantilist purposes (such as food
and livelihood security concerns). 73 While leaders of developed countries
continued to advocate the vital cause of development, these lip-services never
materialized at the negotiation table.74 In the meantime, developing countries
refused to make concessions before developed countries tabled substantial
commitments in the area of agricultural protection.75 It was this “brinkmanship”
that frequently deadlocked the negotiation process.76
At the heart of the North-South clash, as far as the Doha Round is
concerned, laid the domestic politics of rich countries which simply could not
accommodate the cause of development on political terms. The heavily battered
Bush Administration was simply incapable of managing protectionist pressures
from the Congress in its lame-duck period. In a highly symbolic gesture, in April
2007 fifty-eight U.S. Senators jointly sent a warning letter to U.S. President Bush
stating that “our trading partners have refused to offer significant tariff
reductions, and they insist on exceptions for sensitive and special products that
will render meaningless the modest tariff reduction formulas they have
proposed.”77 Yet India and China jointly urged rich countries to cut farm tariffs
and trade-distorting farm subsidies to unclog the stalled negotiation.
Likewise, Charles Grassley, a powerful U.S. farm state Senator, urged
shortly before the collapse of the deal that the U.S. negotiators “pack their bags
and come home” if other trading partners refused to grant U.S. businesses
substantial market access in agricultural and industrial goods.78 Mindful of these
anti-trade sentiments in Congress, the USTR desired to reap substantial
concessions from trading partners and thus rejected any modest package, such as
the “Doha-lite” proposal. 79 Delegates from the U.S.’s major special interest
groups, such as the American Farm Bureau and National Association of
Manufacturers, were actually stationed in Geneva as they monitored and even
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instructed U.S. negotiators. 80 Such circumstances squeezed the negotiational
space of the then USTR Susan Schwab who was preoccupied by the idea of
breaking a deal in Geneva rather than failing to pass it in DC.81 Naturally, these
mercantilist stances by developed countries irked developing countries. Indian
Commerce Minister Kamal Nath commented that rich countries pursued only
“commercial prosperity.”82
In particular, lavish farm protection in major developed countries, such as
the U.S. and the EU, continued to undermine trade liberalization in the
agricultural sector of the Doha Round. Under the EU’s Common Agricultural
Policy, big agro-businesses in France alone receive more than $10 billion a year.83
The EU’s biofuels policy created a tariff equivalent of 1,000% for dubious
environmental benefits. 84 In the U.S., the renewal of the highly protectionistoriented Farm Bill in the middle of the Doha Round negotiation disheartened
many delegates.85 Even the U.S. media lambasted this ignominious bill which
“rewards rich farmers who do not need the help while doing virtually nothing to
help the world’s hungry, who need all the help they can get.”86 As Victor Davis
Hanson trenchantly observed, lavish farm subsidies in the U.S. are “transparent
election-cycle harvests for farm-state politicians, who have small constituencies
but exercise outsized national political clout.” 87 In a six-year cycle, U.S.
politicians have masqueraded this special interest legislation by “phony
rationalizations,” as seen in the “Freedom to Farm Act” (1996), the “Farm
Security and Rural Investment Act” (2002), and the “Farm, Nutrition and
Bioenergy Act” (2008).88
This farm protectionism in the U.S. and EU entails enormous distortion in
the global crop market beyond the level which might be remedied through
occasional WTO litigation. The G-33 bloc’s (food-importing developing
countries) fixation on the SSM originated mainly from rich countries’ highly
subsidized and thus cheapened crop.89 Under these circumstances, “any opening
up of agriculture would be doubly difficult politically because exposing one's
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farmers to the impact of highly subsidized foreign producers is regarded as
yielding to unfair trade.”90 Developing countries tried to fix the raw deal under
the UR. Frustratingly to developing countries, the UR outcome enabled
developed countries to continue their old practice of lavish farm subsidies, but
deterred developing countries from invoking the special safeguard mechanism
under the Agreement on Agriculture for technical reasons.91
In sum, different expectations over the Doha Round bred enormous
tensions between the North and the South in the course of trade talks. While the
South basically demanded from the North unreciprocated disarmament in farm
protection under the DDA, the North still wanted to use the reduction of farm
protection, if any, as bargaining chips for reciprocal concessions from the South
in the areas of both agricultural and industrial market access.
B. The Secondary Cause: The Sterile Environment for Trade Talks
Apart from the abovementioned deep-rooted North-South tensions, a
blend of adverse factors has undermined the odds for a successful round. First, as
most commentators observed, the recent domestic political situations in major
negotiating parties, such as the U.S., EU, and India, have not been amenable to
concessions, leading to a general lack of political support for a deal. Key elections
were pending in the U.S. and India as delegates papered over the modalities. To
make things worse, the Wall Street-born financial crisis quickly spread to the
world and froze global trade, brewing protectionist sentiments. Amid this
economic hardship, some politicians intensified their rhetoric against the Doha
deal. For example, French President Nicolas Sarkozy stated that the EC’s offer
would destroy the European farm sector by reducing agricultural production by
20% and cutting 100,000 jobs.92
Another critical factor militating against a successful deal was the fact that
the U.S. delegation negotiated without “trade promotion authority (TPA),”
formerly known as “fast track authority.” Without TPA, passing the Doha deal in
Congress would have been a very difficult, if not impossible, task for the lameduck administration. This was the case even though U.S. negotiators had been
assured that they could continue the trade talks without TPA - which they argued
would concern only the deal’s ratification in Congress. 93 While the U.S.
negotiators stripped of TPA had to grab a deal which could impress the Congress,
major developing countries, such as Brazil and India, could not simply concede
such a deal without a serious reduction of U.S. farm subsidies, especially in the
absence of TPA.94
One commentator observed that U.S. trading partners “kn[ew] about the
US situation and the severe danger of proceeding, but no country want[ed] to be
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blamed for raising it.” 95 Moreover, the U.S. proposal of cutting the tradedistorting subsidy to $15 billion, if implemented, would have forced the U.S. to
dilute farm protection bestowed by the new Farm Bill which had recently been
passed over presidential veto.96 This forecast seemed to have pushed the U.S.
negotiators to resist loosening the trigger threshold of the SSM, which would
have hampered U.S. farmers’ exports to emerging markets.97 Tom Harkin, chair
of the US Senate agriculture committee, made it clear that this offer was
conditioned on enhanced access by U.S. farmers to foreign markets.98 However,
one might view that a demand for market access in return for undoing
protectionist measures, such as farm subsidies, tends to reveal “an absence both
of economic logic and good faith” and thus seems “unconscionable.”99
III. The Future of the Doha Round: Can Doha Ever Be Saved?
A. The Exigency of the Doha Success
Does the Doha round have a future? Can it ever be salvaged? Considering
the dire consequences that its permanent failure would likely bring, in particular
to the WTO system itself, the better question to ask might be how, not whether, it
can be saved. The global trading community simply cannot afford an eventual
Doha failure against the recent background of global economic hardship. As
global trade is likely to contract in 2009 for the first time since the World War
II,100 the Doha failure would further discredit the WTO system and supply ample
ammunition to politicians bending toward protectionism.
It appears that the timing, not the substance, of a deal will be the most
decisive factor for any successful conclusion of the framework agreement on
modalities, which will guide each member articulating its own improved schedule
of commitments. Just remember how close negotiators were to a deal before its
sudden collapse at the eleventh hour in July 2008. Pascal Lamy observed that out
of 20 topics on the “to-do-list,” members’ positions on 18 topics had converged
before the 19th topic (the special safeguard mechanism) busted the deal.101 The
very fact that the negotiation suddenly fell apart after members had spent so
much time and had acquired substantial mileage signifies the lack of political
will.102 Therefore, without recharged political capital negotiators cannot seal the
deal on modalities.
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Yet the current economic landscape tends to render any political initiative
for free trade unpalatable. First, the global economic crisis appears to have
hardened key players’ intractable positions with regards to their wish-lists.103 For
example, the U.S. has continued to push the “sectoral” approach in industrial
tariffs reduction, which it spearheaded in the July Ministerial in Geneva.
Pressured by domestic interest groups, such as National Association of
Manufactures (NAM), the U.S. desired to draw a substantial level of tariff
reduction commitments in key sectors, such as chemicals, electronics and
industrial machinery, from major importing countries, including China.104 China
also repeated its previous position strongly opposing the U.S.’s approach,
highlighting that participation in the sectoral liberalization program should be
“voluntary.”105
Second, every trade deal tends to inevitably accompany certain churning
effects and therefore leaves domestic losers who will be negatively affected by
increased competition from abroad. Adding this trade-generated dislocation to
recession-generated unemployment might be difficult for any government to
implement. Against this backdrop, having acknowledged that “there was no
readiness to spend the political capital needed,” Lamy cancelled the prescheduled ministerial meeting in December 2008 where negotiators were
supposed to deliver a breakthrough on modalities.106
Nonetheless, forsaking the Doha Round at this stage is not an option since
it would likely broaden the room for protectionism. As discussed above, major
governments have competitively responded to some of the consequences of the
current economic crisis by simply relying on protectionist measures, such as
subsidies.107 If left unchecked, this competition may turn into an ugly trade war,
invoking the old specter of economic balkanization on a global scale. The
conclusion of the Doha Round can effectively deter such proclivity of major
members. In fact, the news of a Doha deal will imbue a strong sign of hope in the
global business community.108
B. Preconditions for a Successful Round
To resume the Doha negotiation, it is vital to mobilize necessary political
capital both domestically and internationally. To mobilize and gather the
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necessary political capital will require monumental leadership from global
leaders. In particular, with a new president in office, the U.S. is uniquely situated
to offer such a vital public good.109 As the world’s most powerful and affluent
country and as the country responsible for engendering the current global
financial crisis, the U.S. should recognize and shoulder its historic responsibility.
As President Obama stated in his inaugural speech, the U.S. has duties to the
world which it “do[es] not grudgingly accept but rather seize gladly.”110 Other
major trading nations, such as the EU, Canada and Japan should join the U.S. in
a move to bold trade liberalization. In fact, trade liberalization means to these
countries the saving of public money as well as the repeal of wasteful rent-seeking
programs. They are nothing but a form of domestic economic reform.
True, the current economic landscape could complicate any trade deal. For
example, the U.S. special interests’ reciprocal demands from the Doha Round
have intensified as the recession worsens.111 Therefore, the Obama administration
continues to highlight “balance” of concessions in the Doha trade talks, which has
freshly been reflected in the recent G20 communiqué issued in April 2009, in
contrast to the November 2008 equivalent containing no such modifier.112 While
it is fortunate that the Obama administration has recently re-engaged in the
Doha Round negotiation, 113 many observers still argue that President Obama
should be more proactive in exercising political capital and leadership which the
exigency of the current financial crisis has called for.114 The U.S. must embrace
multilateralism as a critical global public good over myopic parochial interests.115
If the U.S. provides constructive leadership and revitalizes the largely
dormant Doha Round negotiation, the recently announced WTO Ministerial
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Meeting in Geneva in December 2009116 can deliver a genuine breakthrough deal
on the modalities, given the progress which the negotiations have made thus
far.117 Once WTO members conclude the modalities deal, the rest of the process,
including the actual composition of national schedules based on the modalities
and the subsequent verification, would be finalized rather expeditiously,
potentially within several months.118 This means that WTO members can finalize
the Doha Round by the end of 2010.119
Nonetheless, any attempt to ignore the penultimate deal in the summer of
2008 as well as the whole modalities structure would gravely jeopardize the Doha
Round. 120 Reflecting the increasing impatience from the major U.S. export
industries, USTR Ron Kirk has recently floated the idea of skipping the
modalities deal and instead directly conducting bilateral negotiations to generate
market-opening concessions.121 This idea has gathered little support from other
members, especially from developing countries which fear of being forced into a
disadvantageous position in a bilateral setting with developed countries.122
Likewise, it seems to be vital that WTO members preserve the original
scope of negotiation and defy any unreasonable ambition regarding what the
Doha Round talks might achieve. In fact, the main reason why the last deal was
so close in July 2008 was that Lamy was able to narrow down the zone of
negotiation, excluding potential deal-breakers, such as services, rules
(antidumping) and geographical indications. Although these issues have been
technically part of the Doha trade talks, they do not belong to essential agendas,
such as agricultural trade and industrial tariff (NAMA). Those issues, albeit
important to many members, have not fully ripened for a possible deal mainly
because members’ positions diverge to a great degree and they often cannot agree
on basic concepts.123 Under these circumstances, to cram any of these issues into
a forced march may risk yet another collapse or provide recalcitrant negotiators
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with subterfuges for deal-blocking.124 One commentator aptly encapsulated the
desirable path of the Doha Round as follows: “It is time to step back and build
political support for a limited, scaled-down conclusion to the Doha Round and
then plot a course for the long-term survival of the multilateral system and the
WTO.”125
Conclusion
It would be naïve to interpret an international negotiation like the Doha
Round by a moral mandate only. As the late Tip O’Neill famously stated, all
politics is local, and parochialism is often powerful enough to stall and sink
international trade deals.126 Rightly, those impoverished foreign farmers would
not cast a single vote to American politicians. After all, wouldn’t it be a
democratic virtue to respond faithfully to your own local constituency?
The problem, however, is that “poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to
prosperity everywhere.”127 Although the financial crisis has started in the U.S., it
will soon wreak havoc on the world’ poorest in a highly disproportionate manner.
Poverty is one of the most horrible agonies, and it never comes alone: it allies
with diseases, violence, conflicts and wars. From the insightful perspective of
“comprehensive security” posited by Robert Scalapino,128 tanks and soldiers may
be a necessary but not sufficient condition for peace and security. Genuine peace
and security derives from global citizens who have a decent amount of food to eat
and decent kinds of works to do, which trade can provide. The total financial
burden of concessions necessary to help deliver Doha’s success would be trivial
compared to astronomical military spending to keep the world safe.
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The completion of the Doha Round alone can never solve all the
development problems which the WTO is facing. Yet it is still an important step
to fulfill the ultimate telos of the WTO, “sustainable development,” especially
amid the current global economic crisis.

